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The Mutability of Distributive Justice 
Attitudes in South Africa 
Abstract 
Even after ten years of democratic government, South Africa remains an 
unusually unequal society.  Inequalities in the distribution of incomes both 
reflect and reproduce inequalities of opportunity.  Yet curiously little research 
has been conducted on what South Africans think about inequality, and their 
views on distributive justice.  The limited extant research suggests that most 
South Africans believe that their country is too unequal, that there is strong 
support for government action to reduce inequalities, and that class 
consciousness and racial identities are both widespread.  This paper uses 
existing and new data to show that distributive justice perceptions and attitudes 
in South Africa are mutable: perceptions and attitudes change according to the 
precise question posed, have changed over time, and change in the face of 
counter-arguments.  South Africans, like people in many other parts of the 
world, see some poor people as more deserving than others, with perceived 
desert reflecting recognised needs (e.g. the elderly), responsibilities (e.g. bread-
winners) and behaviour (with respondents being hostile to support for chronic 
drinkers, for example).  Some, but not most, South Africans also become less 
supportive of the government supporting the poor if taxes are to be increased.  
Overall, South Africans seem to recognise a wide range of deserving poor, and 
even richer elites are inclined toward generosity, but support for redistribution 
is far from unconditional. 
Introduction 
Internationally, the study of attitudes towards distributive justice is a rich and 
fast-growing field.  As is generally the case, most research has been conducted 
in societies of North America and Western Europe, which are societies with 
much lower levels of inequality than South Africa, in part due to a variety of 
inequality-reducing interventions by ‘welfare capitalist’ states (to borrow a 
phrase from Esping-Andersen, 1990).  Despite the reduced inequality in these 
societies, scholars have sought to understand why there is not more demand for 
downward redistribution, especially in societies such as the USA where the 
 2
capitalist element in ‘welfare capitalism’ appears stronger than the ‘welfare’ 
component. 
Hochschild’s seminal study of What’s Fair? American Beliefs about 
Distributive Justice (1981) was based on intensive, qualitative interviews with 
twenty-eight working adults in New Haven.  She identified four broad reasons 
for the muted demands for downward redistribution: 
First, some people do not seek it because they do not want it. … Most 
people do not seek downward redistribution because they cannot 
imagine it or do not believe in its possibility. … A few do not seek 
redistribution because they strongly oppose it. … A few people do not 
seek redistribution because they do not care one way or the other 
about it. … They just want to be left alone. (ibid: 278-9) 
But Hochschild also noted a range of redistributive programmes that enjoyed 
strong support: 
Both rich and poor strongly endorse a program of guaranteed jobs. … 
Secondly, both rich and poor support much more equality than they 
realize, as long as it is couched in terms of need, investments, or 
results – anything except equality per se. …  [A]lmost everyone, rich 
and poor, is incensed that the very wealthy do not pay their fair share 
of taxes … [although] no one is enthusiastic about, and very few even 
accept, inheritance taxes. (ibid: 279-80) 
Hochschild also found that attitudes had changed since the 1950s.  People were 
less likely than before to see poverty as a ‘punishment for sin or laziness’, and 
more likely to see it instead as ‘a result of bad luck or even structural biases’ 
(ibid: 280).  Overall, however, too many people are ambivalent about 
redistribution, rarely opposing it but rarely demanding it with any commitment 
or coherence. 
Among the more recent studies of popular attitudes towards poverty and 
inequality is Martin Gilens’ Why Americans Hate Welfare (1999).  Like 
Hochschild, Gilens found that attitudes were complex: 
… Americans oppose welfare, … hold cynical views of welfare 
recipients, and … their thinking about poverty and welfare is 
permeated by their beliefs about blacks.  But just as important is that 
Americans are committed to helping the poor – they donate their own 
time and money to charitable causes, they want their government to 
do more to help the poor, and they consistently express a willingness 
to pay higher taxes to help poor people and welfare recipients obtain 
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better wages, better housing, medical care, child care, education, and 
job training. (Gilens, 1999: x) 
Gilens’ study revolves around understanding how a commitment to 
individualism – ‘pulling yourself up by your own bootstraps’ – can and does 
coexist with strong support for public interventions.  In the USA, public 
interventions are supported if they are seen to help people to help themselves or 
to provide a cushion when individual efforts are not enough.  Opposition to 
welfare is not due to a principled opposition, but rather the perception that most 
welfare recipients are undeserving.  Public interventions are opposed when they 
appear to help the ‘undeserving poor’.  And – in the USA at the end of the 
twentieth century – perceptions of the undeserving poor are bound up with 
racial stereotypes.  Put bluntly, many white Americans dislike welfare because 
it is seen as support for lazy, black people, people whose poverty is seen as 
being due to a lack of effort and who are therefore, as a group, undeserving.  
Attitudes towards welfare are far more racialised than welfare itself: only just 
over one-third of welfare recipients in the USA are African American (ibid: 5). 
Gilens uses an extraordinary range of survey data on public opinion (including 
especially the 1991 National Race and Politics Study, one of a series of 
Berkeley-based projects directed by Paul Sniderman).  These are combined with 
detailed studies of the racialisation of welfare in the media over several decades.  
Most recent studies rely only on survey data, and the explosion of research 
reflects in large part the ready availability of new, cross-national data-sets on 
public opinion (notably the International Social Justice Project – used by, for 
example, Osberg and Smeeding, 2004 – or the older modules on inequality 
included in some International Social Science Program or ISSP surveys – see 
Kluegel et al., 1995). 
Alesina and Glaeser (2004) also point to racial diversity in explaining why there 
is less redistribution through the state from rich to poor in the USA than in 
Europe.  They show that, compared to Europeans, Americans are more likely to 
think that the poor are lazy and could escape from poverty if they worked 
harder.  They also cite evidence from experimental and other studies that people 
are more generous to members of their own racial or ethnic group than to 
members of other groups.  But their primary evidence on the significance of 
racial diversity for redistribution is not attitudinal.  They rely instead on analysis 
on the relationship between racial (or ethnic) fractionalisation and redistribution 
in different countries or (within the USA) different states and cities.  Such 
comparisons consistently show that there is a negative correlation between 
racial diversity and redistribution.   
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In contrast to the abundance of research on ‘Northern’ societies, there is little 
research on public attitudes towards redistribution in the ‘South’.  The obvious 
explanations for this are that public attitudes matter less when there is no 
democracy or democracy is ineffective, that there is relatively little data on 
public attitudes, or that it is impossible to collect meaningful attitude data.  
Unsurprisingly, there is more research on the attitudes towards distributive 
justice and redistribution among elites (see especially Reis and Moore, 2005).  
But all three of the obvious explanations are less compelling than they might 
seem.  As Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi (2004) argue strongly, 
democratisation has meant that public attitudes have become more 
consequential politically, data have become more readily available on many 
aspects of public opinion, and there is little evidence that survey data need be 
viewed with any more circumspection in the ‘South’ than in the ‘North’.  
Studies of popular attitudes toward inequality are beginning to appear in 
Southern contexts such as Brazil (Scalon, 2004). 
South Africa is one country in the South with an astonishing abundance of data 
on public opinion, much of which is publicly available but little of which has 
been analysed.  Series of surveys include: the surveys in South Africa that form 
part of the World Values Survey (in 1981, 1990, 1995 and 2001) and 
Afrobarometer (in 2000, 2002 and 2004); surveys conducted by the Human 
Sciences Research Council (HSRC) as part of their research programme on 
social movements (annually between 1994 and 2000 – see Klandermans, Roefs 
and Olivier, 2001), their general or omnibus national surveys (annually in the 
late 1990s) and the recently-initiated South African Social Attitudes Survey 
(SASAS, in 2003 and 2004); opinion polls conducted by IDASA in the mid- 
and late 1990s; and the South African Reconciliation Barometer conducted by 
the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR) (in 2001 and 2003).  Most of 
these are publicly available (but not the SASAS or IJR data).  All of them 
include odd questions on distributional issues, and some include some very 
useful questions on relative deprivation, perceived justice and so on.  An 
unknown number of other studies using broad samples has been conducted by 
South African political parties, but the data are not publicly available and it is 
difficult to access even the questionnaires.   
In addition to the studies above that used broad samples (although not 
necessarily samples that were represented of the South African population as a 
whole), a range of surveys have been conducted using more limited samples but 
with a more direct focus on distributive issues.  In 2001, the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) conducted a survey in two metropolitan areas (Cape 
Town and Durban) as part of its People’s Security Survey series.  The survey 
examines diverse aspects of ‘insecurity’.  The data are not publicly available, 
but some results have been reported (ILO, 2004).  A series of surveys conducted 
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in Cape Town by the Centre for Social Science Research at the University of 
Cape Town have included questions on distributive justice (see Seekings, 
2002a; Seekings, Alexander et al., 2004; Seekings et al., 2005). 
These various data-sets constitute a considerable – but also under-utilised – 
resource.  Despite the recognition that South Africa has a very high level of 
income inequality, almost no research has been conducted on attitudes towards 
inequality in South Africa.  There is slightly more research about perceptions of 
poverty (May and Norton, 1997; Sangoco, 1998), and this sometimes touches 
on inequality (e.g. Klasen, 1997).  Similarly, research on expectations – 
especially the expectations of newly-franchised black citizens after 1994 – 
sometimes touched on distributional issues (e.g. Charney, 1995; Nattrass and 
Seekings, 1998).  Only recently has there been more work addressing directly 
perceptions of inequality (Klandermans et al., 2001; Seekings, 2002; ILO, 2004; 
Roberts, 2004a, 2004b). 
These studies have generated a number of reasonably clear findings about 
attitudes towards inequality and redistribution in South Africa.  First, most 
South Africans agree that the country is too unequal.  The SASAS data 
reportedly show that South Africans are critical of the extent of inequality in 
South Africa, with people who consider themselves very poor or poor being 
more critical than those who consider themselves comfortably off.  African 
people are more critical than white and coloured people, but Indian people are 
the most critical of all, and the differences are very small (Roberts, 2004b: 15).  
The ILO data also show that many South Africans support upper and lower 
limits on incomes.  Almost half (44 percent) agreed that “there should be an 
upper limit on earned incomes” whilst over half (57 percent) agreed that “there 
should be a minimal income, sufficient to cover basic needs, below which 
nobody’s income should fall”.  Support for an upper limit did not vary by 
education or income, but support for a lower limit was stronger among the non-
poor than among the poor (ILO, 2004). 
Secondly, there appears to be strong support for government interventions to 
help the poor.  The ILO survey found strong approval of government support 
for the poor.  Respondents remained pro-support ‘even if it means that taxes 
must be increased for everybody earning money’ (ibid.).  SASAS data concur 
that South Africans believe that the government should take more responsibility 
for the poor.  There was strong support for government-driven employment 
creation across all racial groups, but only among African people was there a 
majority in favour of race-based affirmative action (in employment), black 
economic empowerment or redistribution of land (Roberts, 2004a: 17; also 
Roberts, 2004b).  The 2001 World Values Survey (WVS) posed a ‘forced 
choice’ question, asking that respondents placed their view on a ten-point scale 
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between two different statements: ‘The government should take more 
responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for’ and ‘People should take 
more responsibility to provide for themselves’.  Overall, using weighted data,1 
almost one in two South Africans (or 46 percent, to be precise) agreed that the 
government should take more responsibility, whereas less than half as many (21 
percent) agreed that people should take more responsibility to provide for 
themselves. 
Thirdly, these studies suggest that race is important in South Africa, but is 
perhaps not as important as might have been expected and is probably declining 
in importance with time.  Charney (1995), using focus group data, challenged 
the view that black South Africans had very high or unrealistic expectations of 
how their lives would improve after apartheid (see also Nattrass and Seekings, 
1998).  Although it is very difficult to measure identities, opinion polls in the 
1990s generally suggested that most South Africans continued to favour racial 
identities over class identities.  In the early 2000s, however, there were some 
indications of change in public attitudes.  The 2003 Reconciliation Barometer 
found that South Africans identified as the ‘biggest division’ in the country 
‘today’ not partisan or racial divisions but rather ‘the division between poor and 
middle income/wealthy South Africans’.  The SASAS conducted in the same 
year found that almost as many people believe that there is ‘strong’ or ‘some’ 
tension between rich and poor people in South Africa as between different races 
(Roberts, 2004b: 16).   
Fourthly, overall, South Africans seem more supportive of government 
interventions and less tolerant of inequality than citizens in most other countries 
surveyed by the WVS.  Cross-national ISSP data suggests that South Africans 
are not unusual in criticising the extent of inequality (and in fact do so less than 
citizens of the transitional societies of post-Communist central and East Europe) 
(Roberts, 2004b).  Over time, white South Africans have grown much less 
opposed to the state assuming a major role in poverty reduction.  WVS data 
show that, in 1991, after the onset of formal negotiations but before the first 
democratic elections, only 9 percent of white South Africans agreed more that 
the government should take responsibility for ensuring that everyone is 
provided for.  By 1996 this had risen to 20 percent, and on to 26 percent by 
2001.  Conversely, the proportion agreeing more that people should take more 
responsibility to provide for themselves fell from 65 percent to 38 percent 
across the same time period. 
                                                 
1 The weights are derived from my calculations, and reflect only racial demographics. 
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Methodological Problems with Existing South 
African Data  
These findings are important, but they are limited to a macro level of 
description and provide little opportunity for understanding the nuances of 
opinion that are central to the work in the USA or Hochschild, Gilens and 
others.  South African data on attitudes towards inequality are limited in at least 
three ways.  These might be called the ‘specification’, ‘costing’ and ‘unit-of-
analysis’ problems.   
The specification problem concerns the problem of specifying a statement or 
question with sufficient precision such that it taps adequately into the normative 
basis of ‘desert’ (i.e. precisely who deserves to get what).  Do questions about 
distribution allow for distinctions between the ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ 
poor?  The World Values Survey (WVS), for example, asks respondents 
whether they agree or disagree with the statement ‘The government is doing too 
little for people in poverty’.  But who, precisely, are ‘people in poverty’?  
Respondents might believe that the government is doing too little for some poor 
but too much for others.  In largely class-based ‘northern’ societies, some 
categories of the poor (the elderly, sick or disabled, children) are widely 
considered more deserving than others (the lazy).  In more culturally-divided 
societies, desert might well be perceived to follow cultural lines (for example, a 
Hausa person from northern Nigeria might believe that the Nigerian government 
does too little to help poor Hausa people but too much to help poor Yoruba 
people).   
The costing problem refers to the trade-offs or costs associated with 
redistributive policies.  The World Values Survey includes sections where 
respondents choose between paired statements (i.e. a forced choice), but these 
rarely get to the heart of the trade-offs around redistribution.  Thus respondents 
are asked to choose between ‘Incomes should be made more equal’ and ‘We 
need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort’, but not 
between pro-poor government spending and lower taxes (yet alone lower taxes 
for specified groups of taxpayers).  Few people disagree that the poor should get 
more if they think that this is costless, but even the poor might baulk if the costs 
(perhaps to ‘deserving’ others as well as to the poor themselves) seem too high.  
Only the ILO asked about support for pro-poor policies if these meant that taxes 
were increased. 
The unit-of-analysis problem concerns the unit of analysis, in the sense of what 
it is that respondents are being asked about.  Questions about the ‘poor’ or 
‘black people’ are asking about a group, not about individual members of these 
groups.  Respondents might be critical of the claims made by a group but not of 
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the desert of individuals within it.  This problem is linked to the first, in that a 
group might include individuals considered deserving along with those who are 
not. 
None of these problems is insuperable.  The specification and ‘individual’ 
problems can be addressed through the use of experimental vignettes – as have 
been used in, for example, the study of the nuances of American attitudes 
around race by Sniderman and Piazza (1993).  Sniderman and Piazza used a 
‘laid-off worker’ experiment.  Respondents are presented with a scenario in 
which a person is said to have been retrenched.  The respondents are then 
invited to suggest how much (if any) financial assistance that person should 
receive from the government whilst looking for work.  The scenario varies 
insofar as the retrenched person is given different characteristics: white or 
black, male or female, younger or older, single or married, with or without 
children, and dependable or not dependable.  Sniderman and Piazza found that 
white, conservative Americans are less supportive of government assistance in 
general than white, liberal Americans, but they are – counter-intuitively – more 
favourably inclined to supporting black claimants (i.e. retrenched workers, in 
the vignette) than white claimants.  Even faced with an unmarried woman with 
children – i.e. a claimant who violates conservative family norms – white 
conservative respondents are more likely to support assistance if the claimant is 
black than if she is white.  If the claimant is described as a dependable worker in 
the vignette, then conservatives are especially inclined to discriminate in favour 
of a black person!  Sniderman and Piazza continue to show that these counter-
intuitive findings co-exist with less surprising findings when white Americans 
are asked about the justice of claims made by black people as a group.  The 
point is not that one set of responses is right and the other set wrong, but rather 
that people hold complex sets of beliefs.  Failing to recognise this complexity, 
Sniderman and Piazza (1993: 86-7) conclude, leads too many commentators to 
see racism ‘where it is not’ and fail to see it ‘where it is’, and thus ‘to ignore 
what they should criticise, and to criticise what they should defend.’ 
The costing problem can also be addressed easily, by probing the resilience of 
opinions in the face of explicit probing about trade-offs or costs.  In a 2000 
survey in poor and middle-income areas in Cape Town, we posed the following 
pair of questions to assess the resilience of views on pro-poor spending: 
Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
M7: The value of the old age pension should be increased 
M8: The value of the old age pension should be increased even if it 
means that people like you have to pay higher taxes. 
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Responses are shown in Figure 1.  It is clear that enthusiasm for increasing 
pensions drops sharply if tax increases are brought into the picture, although 
support does not disappear.  Even in the rising tax scenario, there is more 
support for than opposition to increasing pensions.  A similar question was 
posed in the ILO’s People’s Security Survey: ‘Supporting the poor costs money.  
Do you think more support should be given to the poor even if it means that 
taxes must be increased for everybody earning money?’  Although the wording 
is problematic (see ILO, 2004: 317) and the results are not reported clearly, it 
seems that the question prompts changes in response broadly comparable to the 
2000 Cape Town data. 




















Both experimental vignettes and persuasion experiments have been used 
effectively in South Africa by Gibson and Gouws in their studies of tolerance 
(Gibson and Gouws, 2003) and reconciliation (Gibson, 2004).  In this paper, I 
report on the use of similar techniques in a 2003 survey in Cape Town to 
explore nuances in attitudes towards distributive justice, and in particular to 
begin to address the specification, costing and unit-of-analysis problems.  A 
separate but complementary paper probes the closely related topic of the extent 
to which distributive justice perceptions in South Africa are racialised. 












disagree neither agree strongly agree
Increase pensions Increase pensions even if taxes rise
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Evidence from Cape Town 
In this paper I use data from a 2003 survey in one of South Africa’s largest 
cities, Cape Town.  Cape Town has long had a distinctive demographic, social 
and economic profile.  Until very recently the Western Cape has never had a 
large ‘African’ population, not least because through most of the twentieth 
century there were tight restrictions on immigration, residence and employment 
for African people.  Even in the early twenty-first century, half of the population 
of Cape Town is ‘coloured’, only just over one quarter is African and just under 
one quarter is ‘white’.  There is rapid immigration of African people into the 
city from poorer, more rural areas of the Eastern Cape, but this immigration 
tends to reinforce rather than erode racial segregation and inequality because 
immigrants tend to have few skills.  There is no significant African ‘middle-
class’ in Cape Town, in contrast to the country as a whole; nor are there any 
poor white people.  Cape Town’s population comprises a predominantly 
African poor, a heterogeneous coloured population, and a predominantly white 
upper-income group.  Overall, the Gini coefficient for the distribution of income 
in Cape Town is about 0.58, i.e. rather less than for South Africa as a whole.  
The city is thus distinctively multi-racial as well as highly unequal.   
The 2003 Cape Area Study (CAS), conducted by the Centre for Social Science 
Research at the University of Cape Town, focused on social and political 
attitudes and behaviour (see further Seekings, Alexander et al., 2004). It was 
designed not only to generate data for research but also to experiment with 
questionnaire design and to develop research capacity among social science 
students.  Fieldwork was conducted in predominantly white areas by 
undergraduate students from the University of Cape Town and in predominantly 
African and coloured areas by a commercial social research company, with 
funding from the Mellon Foundation (as part of its support for the Centre for 
Social Science Research).  African fieldworkers conducted the interviews in 
African areas and coloured fieldworkers did so in coloured areas, but in ‘white’ 
areas both the fieldworkers (university students) and the respondents were 
racially diverse.  Fieldwork was conducted in September and October 2003.   
The sample comprised 588 adults spread across metropolitan Cape Town.  It in 
fact comprised three separate samples, one each for areas with predominantly 
African, predominantly coloured (or Indian) and predominantly white 
populations.  Each of these samples was drawn using a two-stage cluster 
sample.  Seventy ‘enumerator areas’ (EAs, as defined by Statistics South Africa 
for the 1996 Population Census) were selected on a probabilistic basis.  White 
areas were over-sampled to cope with anticipated lower response.  Then, in each 
EA, aerial photographs were used to select ten households.  Within each 
household, fieldworkers were instructed to list the names and birthdays of all 
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household members over the age of eighteen, and to interview whoever had the 
next birthday.  The final, actual sample had three weaknesses.  First, student 
fieldworkers were unable to complete their assigned interview loads, conducting 
a total of 188 out of the planned 200 interviews in white areas.  Secondly, 
almost one-third of the interviews were in ‘substitute’ households because the 
fieldworkers were unable to access the sampled household or the household 
member with the next birthday.  Thirdly, although fieldworkers appear to have 
complied with the ‘next birthday’ rule, they did end up with a sample with an 
implausibly high proportion of women.  The data reported in this paper are 
weighted to adjust for race and gender, so that the weighted sample corresponds 
to the total population of Cape Town (according to the 2001 Population 
Census). 
One weakness in the 2003 CAS is the poor quality of data on household 
incomes.  Asked about household income directly, 11 percent refused or said 
they did not know, and 22 percent reported household income of zero.  We 
therefore incorporated into the data-set a neighbourhood-level variable 
indicating the mean household income in the area.  This variable was derived 
from data in the 2001 Population Census, using local government wards as the 
neighbourhood.  Cape Town comprises one hundred local government wards, so 
that wards have an average population of between 25,000 and 30,000 people.   
The ‘Poor’ are Generally Seen as Deserving … 
The CAS 2003 data from Cape Town confirm the finding from previous surveys 
that there is wide support for policies that redistribute to the poor.  We asked six 
questions probing the perceived responsibilities of government to help the poor.  
The weighted distribution of responses is set out in Table 1.  Question F.4 ask 
about equality of opportunity for children.  At present, in South Africa, public 
spending on education is unusually progressive, and enrolment rates are very 
high among poor children even into secondary school, but there are big 
differences between the quality of schooling received.  Children certainly do not 
leave school facing equal opportunities.  Question F.38 asks about what the 
government is currently doing for the poor (in general), and F.12 asks whether 
the government should reduce inequality.  The post-apartheid state claims that it 
does do a lot for the poor (see, for example, South Africa, 2004); elsewhere we 
argue that some government policies are poverty- (and inequality-) reducing but 
others exacerbate or even cause poverty and inequality (Seekings and Nattrass, 
2004).  Whatever the case, poverty and extreme inequality persist (see Seekings, 
Nattrass and Leibbrandt, 2004; Leibbrandt et al., 2005).  Question F.6 asks 
about equality of outcome, but with respect to a group (the elderly) widely 
considered ‘deserving’.  In South Africa, unusually in the developing world, the 
 12
elderly receive a quasi-universal and quite generous non-contributory old-age 
pension.   At the time of the survey, the maximum pension was R700 (or, at the 
exchange rate then, about US$100) per month present.  Question F.13 asks 
about a ‘basic income grant’.  Such a grant was proposed by a government 
committee of inquiry in 2002, churches and trade unions; it would be payable to 
all citizens, but set at a low level of about R100 (US$15) (see Seekings, 2002 
and the articles in Standing and Samson, 2003).  Question F.14 asks about the 
unemployed.  Unemployment in South Africa is very high, at between 30 
percent and 40 percent (depending on how unemployment is defined). 
Table 1: Opinions on government responsibility to help the poor 
Here are some statements about who gets what in society, and why.  For each of these statements, do you strongly 
agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree or disagree strongly? 
 Strongly 
agree 





F.4 The government should 
ensure that children from 
poor families have the same 
opportunities as children 















F.12 The government should 
reduce the differences in 
















F.6 The value of the state old 
age pension should be 
increased (%) 
39 45 6 6 3 6 100 
F.13 The government should 
provide everyone with a 
guaranteed basic income 
(like it does for old people 
















F.14 The government should help 
the unemployed (%) 
38 47 6 5 3 1 100 
Do you think that what the government is doing for people in poverty in this country is about the right amount, too 
much or too little? (%) 
Too much About right Too little Don’t know Total F.38 
3 13 81 3 100 
Support for pro-poor government policies seems to vary from strong to very 
strong.  Massive majorities (over 80 percent) supported the government 
ensuring that children from poor families have the same opportunities as 
children from richer families (F.4), an increase in the value of the state old age 
pension (F.6) and government help for the unemployed (F.14).  A similarly 
massive majority says that the government is doing ‘too little’ for the poor 
(F.38).  Smaller majorities (less than 60 percent) supported the government 
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reducing the differences between rich and poor (F.12) and the introduction of a 
basic income grant for all (F.13).  Whereas there was almost no dissent from the 
first four statements, dissent from these last two interventions stood at about 25 
percent.  Overall, the picture appears to be wide but not unconditional support 
for pro-poor interventions. 
The correlation between these items is surprisingly low (with Cronbach’s alpha 
for the five items at 0.538, and lower still if F38 is included, using unweighted 
data).  Factor analysis suggests that there is one significant underlying factor 
(with an eigenvalue of 1.6) but this explains only 40 percent of the five 
variables’ combined variance. 
The relationship between class (or race) and attitudes on these pro-poor policies 
shows that class (or race) affects attitudes on the different items in different 
ways.  Figure 2 shows the percentage of respondents agreeing with each of three 
propositions: that the value of the old-age pension should be increased, that the 
government should reduce the differences in income between rich and poor, and 
that the government should provide everyone with a guaranteed basic income.  
Class is defined here simply in terms of the mean household income in the 
neighbourhood (measured at ward-level).  There are no major differences by 
class (i.e. neighbourhood income quintile) with respect to the old-age pension, 
but there are differences with respect to a guaranteed basic income and the 
general proposition (that the government should reduce income differences).  A 
low percentage in agreement might mean that respondents disagreed, disagreed 
strongly or said that they neither disagreed or disagreed strongly.  The strongest 
disagreement with the general proposition was in middle-income areas (with 
many respondents in the richest opting for the ‘neither’ response). 
Regressing the composite variable derived from the factor analysis against race 
alone suggests that there is a significant but weak race effect, with being white 
correlating with a less pro-poor attitude; the coefficient of determination (i.e. 
r2), however, is very low (0.04).  Gender, age, marital status and parental status 
are not significant, add little to the explanatory power of the model and do not 
affect the significance of race, but adding in education removes the effect of 
being white relative to being African and adding in an affluence variable largely 
removes the effect of being white relative to being coloured.  Even with all of 
these variables included in the model, the r2 remains low at 0.08.  The effects of 
race appear to be generally weak and differentiated.  This is considered in more 
detail in a separate paper (Seekings, 2005). 
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Figure 2: Support for pro-poor policies, by income in neighbourhood 


















The value of the state old age pension should be increased
The govt should reduce the differences in income between rich and poor
The govt should provide everyone with a guaranteed basic income
 
… But Some Poor People are Considered More 
Deserving than Others 
Capetonians appear to be broadly supportive of pro-poor policies.  But already 
there are signs that some respondents are discerning between different pro-poor 
interventions, and hence perhaps different categories of poor people.  The 
overwhelming support for increased old-age pensions (F.6) and for equal 
opportunities for children (F.4), even among the less pro-poor white 
respondents, suggest that the elderly and children are seen as highly deserving.  
In contrast, more respondents – including a majority of white respondents – are 
opposed to a universal basic income grant (F.13).  The unemployed are seen as 
a deserving category, unsurprisingly in a society in which so much 
unemployment is involuntary. 
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The experimental vignettes included in CAS 2003 provide a more nuanced set 
of insights into the ways in which desert is linked to the characteristics of the 
beneficiary as well as those of the respondent.  One vignette was a version of 
Sniderman and Piazza’s retrenched worker experiment.  Respondents were told: 
‘The government provides grants to some people in need, especially the elderly.  
I am going to describe a situation, and then ask you what the government should 
do to help the person involved.’  The description takes the following form:  
A worker has been retrenched from a company.  [He/she] is a 
[white/coloured/African] [man/woman], in [his/her] [20s/30s/40s], 
[single/married] and [with/without] children.  [He/she] is a 
[dependable/not dependable] worker and now [is/is not] actively 
looking for work. 
Ten different scenarios were used, each of which was presented to about sixty 
respondents.  The first scenario, for example, was: ‘A worker has been 
retrenched from a company.  He is a white man, in his 40s, married and with 
children.  He is a dependable worker and is actively looking for work.’  The 
respondent is then asked: ‘Should the Government provide financial assistance 
to this person whilst he/she is unemployed?’  If the respondent says ‘yes’, he or 
she is then asked ‘how much?’.  We tried to ensure that each scenario was used 
in each EA in our sample so that the sub-samples for each scenario were 
broadly similar (i.e. in terms of the characteristics of the respondents). 
In South Africa there is no general public financial assistance for the 
unemployed.  The Unemployment Insurance Fund provides earnings-related 
assistance for a limited period of unemployment, but only to people who have 
contributed to the fund in the past.  Its limited duration and exclusion of non-
contributors mean that only a very small proportion of the unemployed receive 
UIF benefits.  Most unemployed are compelled to rely on their own savings or, 
more generally, their kin.  The general scenario would therefore probably be 
understood as an extension of the existing welfare system.  
Table 2 shows the percentage of respondents approving of financial assistance, 
and the mean amounts suggested (with amounts of zero entered if the 
respondent was opposed to government support), for each of the ten specified 
sets of characteristics of the retrenched worker.  Overall, six out of ten 
respondents favoured financial assistance to the retrenched worker, with three 
out of ten respondents saying ‘no’, 7 percent saying ‘maybe’ or ‘it depends’ and 
just 2 percent saying that they did not know.  The variations between the 
scenarios were relatively small.  A maximum of 76 percent of respondents 
supported financial assistance for a married, white man, in his 40s and with 
children, who was a dependable worker and was actively looking for work 
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(scenario #1).  A minimum of 49 percent approved financial assistance to an 
unmarried, childless, white man in his 20s (scenario #3).  An almost identical 
proportion (50 percent) approved financial assistance to his African equivalent 
(despite the added stipulation that he was a dependable worker and was actively 
looking for work – scenario #5).  These three cases indicate that the classic male 
breadwinner is deemed more deserving than the unmarried, childless young 
man, perhaps indicating a conservative, family-oriented conception of desert. 
Table 2: Assessments of desert, according to the scenario used 




















1 Male white 40s Yes yes yes 76 65 1302 47 993 
2 Female White 30s No Yes - 59 53 907 32 514 
3 Male White 20s no No - 49 61 769 30 356 
4 Male African 40s yes Yes - 61 61 834 38 533 
5 Male African 20s no no yes 50 57 899 30 438 
6 Female African 20s no Yes - 67 61 1039 40 711 
7 Female African 30s yes No yes 63 50 991 32 689 
8 Male coloured 30s no no yes 58 59 689 36 398 
9 Female Coloured 40s yes Yes - 62 63 1036 39 642 
10 Female coloured 20s no No yes 60 58 753 33 482 
Total  60 588 935 357 573 
Notes: data are weighted.  D* is “dependable and looking for work”. 
The pattern in the amounts that respondents awarded is broadly similar to the 
pattern of whether they favoured financial assistance at all.  The amounts 
awarded were notional in that the question asked how much should the 
government provide per month.  In Table 2, the first column for ‘mean amount’ 
of award includes only those awards greater than zero.  There is considerable 
variation, with the mean award in the most deserving scenario – the older, 
married white man with children, who is a dependable worker and is actively 
looking for work (scenario #1) is almost double the mean award in the least 
deserving scenario – the coloured man, in his 30s, single and without children, 
but a dependable worker and actively looking for work (scenario #8).  Measured 
in terms of the amount awarded, the three most deserving scenarios (#1, 6 and 
9) all entailed retrenched workers with children, and the three least deserving 
scenarios (#3, 8 and 10) all entailed retrenched workers without children. 
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The final column for ‘mean amount if yes or no’ in Table 2 sets a value of 0 for 
cases where the respondent did not consider that the beneficiary should receive 
government assistance.  The figures in this column thus combine the effects of 
both decisions, i.e. whether the beneficiary is deemed deserving and how much 
he/she should receive.  These data confirm that scenarios #1 and 6 involve the 
most deserving cases, and scenarios #3 and 8 the least deserving cases.  Overall, 
the mean award in the most deserving case (#1, male white breadwinner) is 
almost three times larger than the mean award in the least deserving case (#3, 
young white man).  Again, the most deserving scenarios both entailed having 
children, and the two least deserving scenarios entailed not having children. 
The analytic power of vignettes lies primarily in analysing the effects of specific 
characteristics in a pooled sample not in comparing the results of scenarios 
presented to different sub-samples.  Elsewhere (Seekings, 2005), I explore the 
correlates of differential assessments, focusing especially on the significance of 
race relative to other factors (using race variables for both the supposed 
beneficiary in the vignette and for the respondent).  The basic findings are 
simple: race is not significant in the initial assessment of desert, but in assessing 
the amount of an award, race becomes significant, although in initially counter-
intuitive ways.  White respondents are more generous, perhaps because they 
cannot imagine living on low incomes.  And, controlling for other variables, 
white subjects receive larger awards from all respondents.  The only 
interpretation I can provide for this is that respondents are using an income-
replacement approach to assessing awards: larger awards are given to people 
who have previously enjoyed higher incomes. 
Introducing Strong Grounds for Discrimination 
Respondents in our survey discriminated in terms of whether to make an award 
to the supposed subject and, if they thought an award should be made, in how 
large an award.  In combination, as we have seen, these resulted in large 
variations in the mean award made.  But most of this variation arose from 
second stage of assessment, i.e. how large an award.  Discrimination in the 
initial assessment of desert was relatively limited, ranging from a low of 49 
percent support for an award in the least deserving case to a high of 76 percent 
in the most deserving case.  It would seem that the manipulation of the 
characteristics of the subject or beneficiary within a limited range made little 
difference to their perceived desert, regardless of the characteristics of the 
respondent.  CAS 2003 included another step allowing us to probe further the 
nature of perceived desert in South Africa.  A persuasion exercise was 
introduced immediately following the retrenched worker vignette.  The 
persuasion exercise provided additional and, on the face of it, probably 
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compelling information about the beneficiary to the respondent.  Would the 
addition of much more compelling information about the beneficiary have a 
larger effect on perceived desert than the limited manipulation of characteristics 
in the vignette itself? 
If the respondent had initially favoured financial assistance to the retrenched 
worker, he or she was then asked (G.7) ‘Suppose that a friend told you that 
people like this person spend their money on alcohol.  Should the Government 
still provide financial assistance to this person?’  If the respondent had initially 
opposed financial assistance, he or she was then asked (G.8) ‘Suppose that this 
person was going to get sick or even die because he/she could not afford food.  
Should the government then provide financial assistance to this person?’ and 
then (G.9) ‘Suppose that this person’s children were going to go hungry and 
drop out of school.  Should the government then provide financial assistance to 
this person?’.  For each question, response options were ‘yes’, ‘no’, ‘maybe’ or 
‘it depends’, and ‘don’t know’. 
The effects of this additional information were huge (see Table 3 and Figure 3).  
Respondents could quite easily be persuaded to change their views when 
provided with additional information.  Of the respondents who initially agreed 
that the government should assist the unemployed person in the vignette, 71 
percent changed their minds when told that the beneficiary might spend the 
money on alcohol.  As a proportion of the total sample, support for government 
assistance fell from 60 percent to just 11 percent (i.e. 0.17 x 0.6).  Similarly, of 
the respondents who initially said that the government should not assist the 
unemployed person, 57 percent changed their mind faced with the prospect of 
the unemployed person falling sick and perhaps dying, and 61 percent changed 
their mind when told that the person’s children were going to go hungry and 
drop out of school.  As a proportion of the total sample, opposition to support 
dropped from 31 percent initially to just 8 percent when faced with counter-
arguments about the possible consequences of poverty for the individual.  The 
partial exception to the persuasive power of additional information is the case of 
tax increases.  Only one in five respondents who had initially supported 
financial assistance changed their mind when told that taxes might increase.    
The large effects of this additional information (excepting on tax) stand in 
contrast with the relatively muted effects of the characteristics of the beneficiary 
introduced in the vignettes themselves.  There are two possible reasons for this.  
First, the additional information posed much more extreme scenarios in terms of 
desert.  Respondents seem more swayed by issues of individual need and 
behaviour than they are by general socio-demographic factors. Secondly, the 
results might be influenced by the methodology: the persuasion format and 
phrasing might encourage respondents to change their minds.  This suggests 
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some lessons for the design of experiments of this sort.  Ideally, some 
respondents would have been provided with this additional information in the 
original vignettes, whilst others would be presented with some of the original 
information (such as race) in the persuasion format.  This would allow for a 
separation of the effects of the characteristics of the subject from 
methodological effects.  
Table 3: Responses to Persuasion (weighted data) 
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G.6: Suppose that the Government said that it had to 
increase taxes to pay for these grants to the 
unemployed.  Do you still believe that the 
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G.8: Suppose that this person was going to get sick 
or even die because he/she could not afford food.  
Should the government then provide financial 











G.9: Suppose that this person’s children were going 
to go hungry and drop out of school.  Should the 





Figure 3: How resilient are attitudes on desert? 


























Is the mutability of attitudes related to either the characteristics of the 
respondent or those of the supposed beneficiary?  One might imagine that, for 
example, some respondents might be more punitive of drinkers than others, 
whilst some categories of beneficiary (mothers, perhaps) might be deemed 
disproportionately more deserving if they are at risk of falling sick. 
In comparison to the regressions run on the initial responses to the vignettes, 
these new regressions run on changing responses show stronger results.  For 
G.7, regressing change of opinion against the various original characteristics of 
beneficiary and respondent results in a r2 of 9 percent; the only variable with a 
statistically significant relationship with change of opinion is the respondent 
being coloured (relative to being white, that is).  Coloured respondents are more 
likely to punish a drinker by changing their mind and opposing financial 
assistance.  For G.8 and G.9, few of the characteristics of the respondent have a 
statistically significant relationship with whether or not he or she changes 
his/her mind and now supports financial assistance; the exceptions are whether 
the respondent is working (which makes it less likely that he or she will change 
his opinion) and (for G.8 but not G.9) if he/she is African (which makes it more 
likely that he or she will change his/her mind).  But most of the characteristics 
of the beneficiary are statistically significant: the respondent is more likely to 
change his/her mind if the beneficiary is female, African, older or unmarried, 
and less likely if the beneficiary is coloured.  Perversely, the respondent is also 
less likely to change his/her mind if the beneficiary has children (but this 
finding might be viewed with caution, as G.9 should not have been asked in 
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cases where the beneficiary was described in the original vignette as not having 
children).  Overall, the r2s for these probits on G.8 and G.9 are 25 percent and 
19 percent respectively. 
Wide but not so Shallow: Taxation and Desert 
Support for democracy in Africa is ‘wide but shallow’, argue Bratton et al. 
(2004: chapter 3) using Afrobarometer data.  By this, they means that most 
ordinary people across Africa say that they support democracy, preferring it to 
alternative forms of government, but ‘prodemocracy sentiments may be a 
veneer beneath which lasting democratic commitments, behaviours and habits 
have yet to take root’ (ibid: 85).  Is the same true in South Africa with regard to 
support for reducing inequality through public expenditure?  Crucially, how 
does the prospect of paying taxes affect support for public expenditure? 
Table 4: Attitudes towards taxation 
 Here are some statements about who gets what in society, and why.  For each of these statements, do 










F.11 Taxation should be 
increased so that more 
money is available for the 















F.9 Poor people pay too much 
tax (%) 
17 31 11 23 7 11 100 
F.10 People like you pay too 
much tax (%) 
21 35 11 19 7 7 100 
F.7 The government old age 
pension should be increased 
even if it means that people 
















In Cape Town, we found that strong support for pro-poor policies co-exists with 
strong opposition to tax increases (see Table 4).  A majority of respondents 
believe that people like them pay too much tax and a very clear majority (70 
percent) is opposed to increasing taxes to finance more spending.  More than 
half of our sample said that people like them paid too much tax.  Responses to 
our different questions about tax varied by class, measured again in terms of the 
mean household income in the neighbourhood (i.e. the local government ward) 
(see Figure 4).  In richer areas, respondents were more likely to be opposed to 
 22
increasing taxation to fund increased state spending (F.11).  But the pattern is 
more complex for the other questions.  Respondents in the poorest 
neighbourhoods do not agree that poor people pay too much tax (F.9) or that 
people like them pay too much tax (F.10).  Agreement with these two 
statements is strongest not in the richer areas, but in the second and third ward 
income quintiles. 
Figure 4: Opposition to tax increases, by neighbourhood 

















Taxation should not be increased to allow more spending
Poor people pay too much tax
People like me pay too much tax
Do not increase pension if people like me pay more tax
 
When tax increases are linked to the deserving poor, however, the discouraging 
effects of cost are muted.  Support for increasing the old-age pension does drop 
when the implication of tax increases ‘for people like you’ is specified, but only 
from 84 percent (when there is no mention of tax increases) to 54 percent.  
Opposition more than triples, from 9 percent to 30 percent (see Table 4 and 
Figure 4).  Opposition is strongest not among the rich, but among respondents 
in the second and third ward income quintiles.  Overall, almost 50 percent of 
respondents became less supportive (for example, shifting from ‘strongly agree’ 
to merely ‘agree’ or from ‘neither agree nor disagree’ to ‘disagree’).  
Nonetheless, even with the tax increase specification, a majority of respondents 
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still supported increasing the value of the old-age pension.2  Similarly, in the 
‘retrenched worker’ experiment, only 21 percent of the respondents who 
supported financial assistance changed their minds when faced with a likely tax 
increase to pay for it.  This compares to 70 percent who changed their minds 
when faced with the information that the beneficiary might spend the grant on 
alcohol.  In short, taking tax into account influences some people’s assessment 
of desert, but not nearly as much as taking into account aspects of the behaviour 
of the poor themselves. 
We can compare the respondents who became less supportive of increasing old-
age pensions when the issue of tax increases was raised with those respondents 
who were as supportive with the tax caveat.  Being white or being rich made a 
respondent much less likely to become less supportive of increasing the 
pension.3  It is perhaps unsurprising that richer people feel that they can 
accommodate an increase in tax more easily than a poor person, but it is curious 
that the coefficient for being white is negative even when in a multivariate 
regression that takes being rich into account separately.  This is perhaps 
evidence for the argument I have advanced elsewhere (Seekings, 2004) that the 
coincidence of racial privilege with class privilege makes white South Africans 
unusually willing (for a developing country society) to support redistribution to 
the deserving poor. 
CAS 2003 also included a question about taxation in the persuasion component 
of the ‘retrenched worker’ vignettes.  Respondents who initially favoured public 
assistance to the subject described in the vignette were then asked (G.6) 
‘Suppose that the Government said it had to increase taxes to pay for these 
grants to the unemployed.  Do you still believe that the Government should 
provide financial assistance to this person?’  Initially, 60 percent of all 
respondents (faced with the various scenarios) said that the subject should 
receive financial assistance from the government.  Of these, two-thirds said that 
the subject should receive support even if it meant that taxes were increased.  In 
other words, 40 percent of respondents said that the subject should receive 
                                                 
2 The distribution of responses to these two questions in 2003 was very similar to the distribution 
in the 2000 KMPS (Seekings, 2002: 13-14; note that the scoring in KMPS was the reverse of 
CAS2003).  KMPS did find less opposition to tax increases for unspecified purposes, 
presumably reflecting the absence of upper income respondents in that survey. 
3 The dprobit coefficients are 0.17 for being African and 0.22 for being coloured (both relative to 
being white), and -0.22 for being rich.  A similar multivariate dprobit regression for changing 
opinion in G.6 finds insignificant race effects but a similarly significant and negative income 
effect (with the dprobit coefficient being -0.17).  Both regressions used the full set of respondent 
socio-demographic characteristics used in Appendix A.  All four of these relationships are 
significant at the 1 percent level.  A survey in African and coloured areas of Cape Town in 2000 
found similar evidence of aversion to tax-funded pension increases among poor African and 
coloured respondents (see Seekings, 2002). 
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support even if taxes had to be raised.  This again underscores the resilience of 
support for redistribution in the face of the costs thereof, especially when 
compared to the lack of resilience of support for redistribution in the face of bad 
behaviour by the poor themselves. 
Conclusion 
We have seen that most but not all respondents see a wide range of poor people 
as deserving of public assistance, but that they discriminate on the basis of the 
characteristics of the beneficiary.  Many respondents seem to assess old people 
and children as being more deserving than people in general, favouring 
increased old-age pensions and assistance for children more than they favour a 
basic income grant for all.  In the vignette, however, the specified characteristics 
of the retrenched worker made relatively little difference to the initial 
assessment of desert.  Only when we introduced additional information – about 
the beneficiary drinking, falling sick or being unable to keep a child in school – 
did the characteristics of the beneficiary make a big difference to perceived 
desert.  Accepting that this final result probably reflects in part the 
methodology, it does seem likely that respondents are influenced less by the 
race and other social and demographic characteristics of the beneficiary than 
they are by the beneficiary’s behaviour (drinking) or need (in terms of the real 
consequences of post-retrenchment poverty).  This finding must be viewed as 
inconclusive, but it is striking. 
The prospect of higher taxation does diminish support for pro-poor policies, but 
not by as much as negative information about the behaviour of the poor 
themselves.  Tax increases seem less important than welfare recipients spending 
their grants on alcohol.  Being white or rich actually made respondents less 
likely to change their opinions when faced with the prospect of tax increases. 
Figure 5 summarises the range of responses in assessments of desert.  Almost 
everyone supports proposals such as increasing the value of the old-age pension, 
helping the unemployed and ensuring equal opportunities for poor and rich 
children.  Very small majorities support a guaranteed basic income for all, or 
increasing the pension if it means increasing taxes also.  The different versions 
of the retrenched worker vignette elicited positive responses from between 49 
and 76 percent of respondents.  But, when told that people like the retrenched 
worker spent their money on alcohol, only 10 percent of respondents supported 
financial assistance.  This was more or less the same proportion as that which 























Respondents are open to persuasion.  Figure 3 showed that assessments of 
desert are not very resilient in the face of counter-arguments.  Most respondents 
who initially assessed that the subject in the vignette should receive financial 
assistance changed their minds when faced with counter-arguments about tax or 
the spending patterns of welfare-recipients.  Similarly, few respondents who 
initially did not think that the subject was deserving stuck by this view in the 
face of strong counter-arguments about the possibility of negative effects on the 
subject’s health or children’s schooling. 
Assessments of desert in South Africa, as in other places, are heavily dependent 
on the specification of the situation.  Some poor people are seen to be deserving, 
others less or or not at all.  Unlike in the USA, constructions of desert in South 
Africa do not appear to be informed significantly by racial stereotypes.  Overall, 
many poor people are considered deserving, probably because they are seen as 
victims of situations beyond their control (old age, poor parents, 
unemployment).  This results in high overall levels of support for pro-poor 
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Appendix A: Perceived desert, by 
characteristics of ‘beneficiary’ and respondent 
 % say yes N Mean 
amount 
(R) 
Std. dev. N 
Characteristic of retrenched worker 
Male 59 303 914 695 145 Gender 
Female 62 285 953 799 159 
White 61 179 1035 768 80 
African 60 229 947 764 129 
Race / population 
group 
Coloured 60 108 836 708 95 
20s 56 237 880 783 116 
30s 60 162 864 689 84 
Age 
40s 66 189 1056 750 104 
Married 65 156 1040 797 136 Marital status 
Not married 57 349 851 702 168 
Yes 65 303 1031 734 165 Has children? 
No 56 285 822 757 139 
Yes 61 289 935 857 150 Dependable 
worker, actively 
looking for work? 
Not specified 60 179 934 630 154 
Characteristic of respondent 
Male 58 230 940 733 113 Gender 
Female 63 358 930 734 195 
White 64 139 1519 973 56 
African 61 197 685 399 112 
Race / population 
group 
Coloured 59 234 913 750 136 
20s 59 140 938 896 74 
30s 59 139 980 673 68 
Age 
40s 66 111 780 495 50 
Married 69 297 935 716 143 Marital status 
Not married 62 291 934 781 161 
Yes 61 426 874 682 223 Has children? 
No 58 161 1093 889 81 
Working 60 272 1097 856 133 Occupational 
status Not working      
Income Rich 62 123 1197 743 48 
< grade 7 59 72 704 361 38 
Grades 7 - 9 60 132 763 562 83 
Grades 10 -11 62 131 792 615 73 
Grade 12 60 137 1124 865 59 
Education 
> grade 12 59 112 1427 1000 54 
Respondent-beneficiary pairing 
White-to-white 66 41 1959 1297 11 
White-to-African 67 55 1486 817 28 
White-to-coloured 58 43 1288 867 17 
African-to-white 63 61 745 289 32 
African-to-African 63 79 712 506 48 
African-to-coloured 58 57 591 273 32 
Coloured-to-white 58 69 1014 646 37 
Coloured-to-African 55 93 900 794 53 
Coloured-to-coloured 62 72 850 765 46 
Note: mean amount awarded is only if an award was approved, i.e. if >0.  Data generated using vignette.do. 
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